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Abstract : 
This study aims to analyze the effect of the effectiveness of internal 
control, independent commissioners, the expertise of the board of 
commissioners, the number of audit committees, and the expertise of the 
audit committee on tax avoidance in manufacturing companies listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2016-2018. This research is expected to 
be a material consideration for companies in making decisions related to 
taxation. The deductive approach used in this study by developing 
hypotheses based on relevant theories and findings of previous studies. 
Agency theory is used to see the effect of corporate governance on tax 
avoidance. The data collection method uses secondary data from the 
company's financial statements and annual reports according to specific 
criteria. Data analysis was performed by descriptive statistics and multiple 
linear regression. The results of the regression analysis prove that 
effectiveness of internal control and number of audit committees had a 
positive effect which means higher effectiveness of internal control and 
number of audit committees cause more tax avoidance, conversely 
independent commissioners and expertise of the board of commissioners 
had a negative effect which shows greater independent commissioners and 
expertise of the board of commissioners cause less tax avoidance. Another 
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result claim that the expertise of the audit committee did not affect on tax 
avoidance. In contrast to previous studies, this study is more varied by 
combining several independent variables. 
Keywords: Audit Committees, Board of Commissioners, Internal Control, 
Tax Avoidance.  
JEL Codes: G34, H26.   
1. Introduction 
Tax compliance is a concerning issue today. Tax compliance is a 
requirement to increase tax revenue (Puspita, Subroto, & Baridwan, 2016). 
Based on reports from the Directorate General of Taxes, the ratio of 
taxpayer compliance levels in Indonesia was 63.15% in 2016 and 72.60% in 
2017. The ratio is still below the average target set by the government, 
which is 72,50% and 75%. Besides, based on official data from the Ministry 
of Finance, the tax ratio in Indonesia in 2016 was 10.8% and in 2017 it 
decreased to 10.7%. The low level of the tax ratio illustrates the low amount 
of tax revenue during this period, which can be influenced by tax avoidance. 
Tax avoidance is an action taken by a company to manipulate taxes using 
legal methods through tax planning activities (Frank, Lynch, & Rego, 
2009). Desai & Dharmapala (2009) state that tax avoidance is an act that 
uses legal methods to reduce the obligation to pay taxes. Lanis & 
Richardson (2013) state that tax avoidance is an irresponsible action taken 
by a company and consequently can reduce the company's image in public. 
This action can be influenced by several factors, including effective internal 
control, independence commissioners, the expertise of the board of 
commissioners, the number of audit committee members, and the expertise 
of the audit committee. 
Internal controls applied in the company function to ensure that 
company management does not violate applicable regulations (Rae, Sands, 
& Subramaniam, 2017). Huang and Chang (2015) state that internal control 
can reduce the opportunistic behavior of management in tax avoidance. 
Good internal control can prevent management from acting 
opportunistically in tax planning and encourage management to understand 
the regulations that apply to tax planning. Furthermore, the independent 
commissioner becomes a factor influencing tax avoidance. An independent 
commissioner should act independently in carrying out the oversight 
function of the actions taken by the company's management and in making 
decisions so that the resulting decisions are not biased. Through its 
independence, the board of commissioners is expected to be able to increase 
the effectiveness of the performance of the board of commissioners. Related 
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to the duties and responsibilities of the board of commissioners, the next 
factor affecting tax avoidance is the expertise of the board of 
commissioners. The board of commissioners should have sufficient 
knowledge to be able to evaluate the company's financial statements which 
are representative of management's performance. That way it is expected to 
control the tax avoidance actions taken by management. Besides, the duties 
and responsibilities of the board of commissioners are to supervise the 
performance of management to ensure that the company has been carried 
out properly. Another factor that influences tax avoidance is the number of 
audit committee members in a company. By the regulations of the financial 
services authority, members of the audit committee are appointed and 
dismissed by the board of commissioners and consist of at least three people 
from independent commissioners and parties from outside the company. 
DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed (2002) stated that an effective 
audit committee should have adequate resources, especially regarding the 
number of members of the audit committee to carry out their duties and 
responsibilities. The audit committee is responsible to the board of 
commissioners in helping carry out the supervisory board’s duties and 
functions. The audit committee's expertise in relation to its duties in helping 
carry out the functions and duties of the board of commissioners is the last 
factor affecting tax avoidance. Therefore, the audit committee should have 
expertise in accounting or finance. Regulations issued by the financial 
services authority require that at least one member of the audit committee 
has an educational background in accounting and finance. Therefore, the 
variables of the effectiveness of internal control, independent 
commissioners, the expertise of the board of commissioners, the number of 
audit committees, and audit committee expertise are relevant in representing 
the corporate governance variables. 
The results of previous studies conducted by Bimo, Prasetyo, & 
Susilandari (2019) states that the most effective internal control, the easier 
to reduce tax avoidance in companies. When compared with other studies, 
not many researchers have examined the effectiveness of internal control 
variables so that it becomes a research gap that needs to be developed in this 
study. Furthermore, previous research conducted by Tandean & Winnie 
(2016) stated that the proportion of independent commissioners did not 
affect on tax avoidance. Another study conducted by Pratama (2017) stated 
that the proportion of independent commissioners had no significant effect 
on tax avoidance. Subsequent research conducted by Lanis & Richardson 
(2011) stated that independent commissioners had a negative and significant 
effect on tax avoidance. The difference in the results of the study became a 
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research gap from this study that could be developed to prove the results of 
the influence of independent commissioners on tax avoidance. On the other 
hand, previous research conducted by Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, & 
Larcker (2015) stated that board expertise has a positive (negative) 
relationship with tax avoidance depending on the level of tax avoidance. So 
far there have not been many other studies examining the expertise of the 
board of commissioners on tax avoidance so that it becomes a research gap 
of the research to be conducted. Then, previous research conducted by 
Tandean & Winnie (2016) stated that the audit committee produced a 
negative influence on tax avoidance. This opinion is in line with the results 
of Pratama (2017) research. Tjondro & Olivia (2018) in their research stated 
that the number of audit committees had a positive effect on tax avoidance. 
Subsequent research conducted by Septiya & Novita (2018) stated that the 
number of audit committee members did not affect on tax avoidance. The 
difference in the results of these studies is the research gap of this study. 
Besides, research conducted by Deslandes, Fortin, & Landry (2019) states 
that audit committee expertise is negatively related to tax aggressiveness. 
Other research conducted by Indayani (2019) stated that the audit committee 
competency did not affect on tax avoidance. This opinion is in line with the 
results of Arismajayanti & Jati (2017) research. The inconsistency of the 
research becomes the research gap of this research. In contrast to previous 
studies, this study is more varied by combining several independent 
variables such as the effectiveness of internal control, independent 
commissioners, the expertise of the board of commissioners, the number of 
audit committees, and the expertise of the audit committee on tax avoidance. 
This research can be a material consideration for companies in making 
decisions about the factors that influence tax avoidance. Besides, the 
company is expected to become even more concerned with tax avoidance. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Agency Theory is one of the theories used in several previous 
studies relating to tax avoidance. Jensen & Meckling (1976) explain that 
agency relationships occur when one or more people give the work to 
another person and give the person the authority to make decisions. In these 
circumstances, no one can ensure that the agent acts to safeguard the 
interests of the principal. Godfrey, Hodgson, Tarca, Hamilton, & Holmes  
(2010:362) stated that agency problems arise when agents behave as if they 
prioritize the principal's interests by maximizing their welfare. Besides,  
Eisenhardt (1898) stated that this theory assumes three human traits, 
including human selfishness, humans have a limited ability to think about 
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future perceptions, and humans always avoid risk. In this case, management 
is responsible for maximizing the benefits of the owner to get profit while 
shareholders focus on increasing the value of their shares so that it creates 
two different interests where each party tries to achieve or maintain the 
desired level of prosperity so that it triggers the emergence of agency 
theory. Therefore, the principal as the owner of the company should prepare 
appropriate incentives to motivate managers to work optimally in making 
decisions and supervising to avoid undesirable situations. 
Agency costs arise due to agency theory. These expenses are used to 
measure, control, and oversee the actions taken by managers in managing 
the company. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that the challenge for the 
board of commissioners and shareholders is to minimize agency costs in an 
appropriate manner and with appropriate incentives. Godfrey, Hodgson, 
Tarca, Hamilton, & Holmes (2010:363) divides agency costs into 
monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss. Monitoring costs are 
costs incurred by the owner of the company to oversee management 
behavior. Bonding costs are costs incurred by company owners so that 
management complies with applicable rules and acts in accordance with the 
interests of the company owner. Residual loss is a cost that arises due to 
differences in decisions taken by management and company owners, 
thereby reducing the principal’s prosperity. Costs arising from agency 
theory add to the costs that must be incurred by the company so that 
management must act more effectively in managing the company. 
2.1 Tax Avoidance and Effectiveness Internal Control 
Tax avoidance is away taken by management to reduce tax payments 
on income before tax (Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2010). Lee & Kao 
(2018) see tax avoidance as a form of tax planning carried out by 
management to increase company value. But these goals will not be 
achieved if management behaves opportunistically (Shin & Park, 2019). In 
agency theory, management has an incentive to increase compensation and 
bonuses when tax avoidance (Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, & Larcker, 
2015). The method used by management to increase profits after tax is to 
reduce the company's tax expense (Gaaya, Lakhal, & Lakhal, 2017). 
Internal control is used within the company to ensure that the 
company's goals have been achieved, financial statements are free from 
material misstatements, comply with applicable regulations, and protect 
company assets (Rubino & Vittola, 2014). Huang & Chang (2015) in their 
research stated that internal control can reduce the opportunistic behavior of 
management in taking tax avoidance actions. Therefore, more effective 
internal control can reduce the tax avoidance actions taken by management. 
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Research conducted by Bimo, Prasetyo, & Susilandari (2019) states that 
more effective internal control reduces tax avoidance. Based on empirical 
evidence from the research, internal control can reduce tax avoidance 
because it can prevent and detect mistakes made by management either 
intentionally or unintentionally so that management complies with 
applicable regulations. This is also influenced by the company's internal 
environment because as a system internal controls are influenced by the 
environment in which the system is located. Thus, the hypothesis of this 
study is as follows: 
H1: The effectiveness of internal control has a negative effect on tax 
avoidance.  
2.2 Tax Avoidance and Independent Commissioner 
Indonesia implements a two-tier system in companies where there 
are boards of commissioners and boards of directors with their respective 
functions. The board of commissioners is at the highest level after 
shareholders and has a leading role in corporate governance. In this case, the 
company has legal responsibilities related to the company's activities so that 
the board of commissioners plays an important role in setting objectives, 
policies, and selecting adequate resources for the top level. Based on 
financial services authority regulations, an independent commissioner is part 
of a board of commissioners originating from outside the company and 
fulfilling the requirements as an independent board of commissioners.  
The board of commissioners is responsible for carrying out the 
oversight function of management performance to ensure that the company 
has been run properly and the interests of shareholders can be protected. 
Besides, the board of commissioners can also provide advice and ensure that 
the company has implemented good corporate governance (Komite 
Nasional Kebijakan Governance, 2006). Independent commissioners on the 
board of commissioners help plan the company's strategy, in the long run, 
monitor the implementation of the strategy and reduce corporate tax 
avoidance. Therefore, the greater the proportion of independent 
commissioners within the company, it can reduce tax avoidance. Previous 
research conducted by Lanis & Richardson (2011) stated that independent 
commissioners had a negative and significant effect on tax avoidance 
because the independence of the board of commissioners could increase the 
effectiveness of supervision of management actions and increase corporate 
tax compliance. Based on the description, the research hypothesis is as 
follows:  
H2: Independent commissioners has a negative effect on tax avoidance. 
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2.3 Tax Avoidance and Expertise of The Board of Commissioners 
The two-tier system implemented by Indonesia makes the board of 
commissioners and board of directors in one company. Jungmann (2006) 
explains that both carry out their respective responsibilities in carrying out 
the supervision and management of the company as a representation of 
shareholders and management. Minnick & Noga (2010) argue that good 
corporate governance will improve corporate tax management. The board of 
commissioners is part of corporate governance that will determine the 
company's tax management so that it requires a quality board of 
commissioners. The quality of the board of commissioners is seen from 
their expertise based on their educational background. 
Research conducted by Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, & Larcker 
(2015) states that the board of commissioners who have financial 
knowledge influences tax avoidance depending on the level of tax 
avoidance where the board of commissioners will be better able to monitor 
the company's tax position in tax planning. In his research also stated that 
the higher expertise of the board of commissioners could inhibit the increase 
in corporate tax avoidance when tax avoidance was too high because it 
could pose risks in the form of sanctions and a decline in corporate 
reputation. Therefore, the hypothesis of this study is as follows: 
H3: The expertise of the board of commissioners has a negative effect on 
tax avoidance. 
2.4 Tax Avoidance and The Number of Audit Committee 
The audit committee is formed and dismissed by the board of 
commissioners and is responsible to the board of commissioners in carrying 
out their duties and responsibilities. Every company is required to have an 
audit committee consisting of at least three people, an independent 
commissioner as the chairman of the audit committee and a commissioner 
who comes from outside the company following regulations issued by the 
financial services authority. Vafeas (1999) states that the number of audit 
committees with a larger size can lead to inefficient corporate governance 
because it causes more frequent audit committee meetings. Raghunandan & 
Rama (2007) state that the number of audit committee meetings can increase 
as the number of audit committees increases. 
The audit committee is part of corporate governance. Inefficient 
corporate governance causes several weaknesses, one of which is the lack of 
a process of supervision of management actions. Gaaya, Lakhal, & Lakhal 
(2017) stated that management tends to reduce the tax expense to increase 
profit after tax so that management gets compensation and bonuses. In line 
with this opinion, Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, & Larcker (2015) 
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suggested that management has incentives to avoid tax to increase 
compensation and bonuses. Tjondro & Olivia (2018) in their research stated 
that the number of audit committees had a positive effect on tax avoidance 
because the company looked at tax avoidance in terms of efficiency and 
consideration of tax risk. In terms of efficiency, tax avoidance is measured 
using a utilitarian approach based on the value of its use if companies avoid 
tax, the value and performance of the company increases, but the audit 
committee in Indonesia considers that corporate tax risk is low so it does not 
become a major problem that needs to be evaluated. Therefore, tax 
avoidance actions taken by companies are high. The greater number of audit 
committee members can increase tax avoidance actions taken by 
management. Based on the description, the hypothesis of this study is as 
follows: 
H4: The number of audit committee members has a positive effect on tax 
avoidance. 
2.5 Tax Avoidance and Audit Committee Expertise 
The audit committee was formed to assist the board of 
commissioners in overseeing the company's performance. In carrying out 
their duties, the audit committee consists of at least three people, one of 
whom has an accounting and financial background. The background is 
related to the expertise that should be possessed by the audit committee. 
Dezoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed (2002) stated that the 
competence of the audit committee increased the number of material 
misstatements found in the company's financial statements. Besides, 
research by Hsu, Moore, & Neubaum (2018) states that the audit committee 
has financial expertise related to tax avoidance. The audit committee that 
has accounting and financial expertise are in a position to oversee and 
provide advice for executive decisions regarding tax planning carried out by 
the company and the risks arising from such actions. Other research 
conducted by Robinson, Xue, & Zhang (2012) found a negative relationship 
between audit committees with special financial expertise in accounting and 
the tendency to use high-risk tax planning. Deslandes, Fortin, & Landry 
(2019) in their study stated that audit committee expertise was negatively 
related to tax aggressiveness. Thus, the hypothesis of this study is as 
follows: 
H5: Audit committee expertise has a negative effect on tax avoidance 
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Research Sample and Data 
The research sample used in this study was manufacturing 
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companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2016-
2018. Manufacturing companies were chosen as research samples in this 
study because manufacturing companies have the highest number of 
companies compared to other sectors and consist of various industrial sub-
sectors so that the scope is broad. Manufacturing companies are also 
companies that have experienced significant growth. This is supported by 
data from the Central Statistics Agency which states that the growth of large 
and medium manufacturing industry growth in quarter III-2018 increased by 
5.04% from quarter III-2017 due to an increase in apparel industry 
production of 23.13%. Growth in the production of micro and small 
manufacturing industries in the third quarter of 2018 also experienced an 
increase of 3.88% from the third quarter of 2017 due to an increase in 
production of the base metal industry by 18.64%. Data is collected from the 
company's financial statements and annual reports according to specific 
criteria. These criteria include companies that have been listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, published audited annual financial reports and 
company annual reports, recorded using Rupiah currency, made a profit or 
no losses, and paid cash taxes. Company reports are obtained through the 
official website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (www.idx.co.id) and the 
company's official website for data that cannot be found on the official 
website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Thus, observational data obtained 
were 276 data. Data processing in this study uses descriptive statistics and 
multiple linear regression models. 
3.2 Measurement of Variables 
 The independent variables in this study are the effectiveness of 
internal control, independent commissioners, the expertise of the board of 
commissioners, the number of the audit committee, and audit committee 
expertise. The measurements of the independent and control variables are 
displayed in the table below:  
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Table 1 : Measurement of Variables 
Variables Symbols Measurement 
The 
effectiveness of 
internal control 
IC This variable measured using the scoring method. 
Assessment in this method is done by asking several 
questions to the company regarding the internal control 
system, the objectives of internal control, and risk 
management. If the company gives the information by 
answering the question given it will be given point 1 and if 
the company does not answer the question given it will be 
given point 0. The total score:  
          The score obtained from companies         x 100% 
The number of questions given to the company 
Independent 
commissioners 
BIND                 Independent commissioners               x 100% 
The total members of the board commissioners 
The expertise of 
the board of 
commissioners 
BEXP The number of commissioners with  
accounting and financial background               x 100% 
Total members of the board of commissioners 
The number of 
audit committee 
AC ∑ number of audit committee members 
Audit 
committee 
expertise 
ACEXP The number of the audit committee with  
accounting and financial background       x 100%  
Total members of the audit committee            
Cash effective 
tax rate 
CETR Cash paid for taxes x 100% 
Income before tax 
Total asset TA Total current asset + Total non-current asset 
Return on asset ROA Income after tax x 100%  
Total asset 
Debt to equity 
ratio 
DER Total debt    x 100% 
Total equity 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on prior studies 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The results and discussion in this study are the assessment of 
descriptive analysis and multiple linear analysis to test the hypothesis and 
discuss the results of the research. Descriptive analysis of the study is 
described in the table below: 
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Table 2 : Descriptive Statistics Result 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
IC 0.00000 1.00000 0.7234300 0.32967470 
BIND 0.20000 1.00000 0.4151988 0.11797139 
BEXP 0.00000 1.00000 0.5185213 0.26229032 
AC 0 5 3.05 0.423 
ACEXP 0.00000 1.00000 0.7246981 0.31665695 
CETR 0.01504 2.95551 0.4390721 0.44687443 
TA 89327328853 344711000000000 9907144082215.86 33736314931552.066 
ROA -0.00441 0.71602 0.0392655 0.06118473 
DER -3.41581 8.74643 0.8673853 1.00899109 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
    
Source : Results of data processing with SPSS 23 
 
The descriptive statistics table above was obtained from 276 
observational data from 2016-2018. The average value of the effectiveness 
of internal control in the company is 0.7234300 with a maximum value of 
1.00000 indicating 100% disclosure of internal control information. 
Independent commissioners and expertise of the board of commissioners 
have an average value of 0.4151988 and 0.5185213 with a maximum value 
of 1.00000. Then the average value of the number of audit committees and 
expertise of the audit committee is 3.05 and 0.7246981with a maximum 
value of 5 and 1.00000, respectively. The average CETR is 0.4390721 with 
a standard deviation of 0.44687443 meaning the average tax paid by a 
company is 43,9%. Total assets that represent the value of the company 
have an average value of 9907144082215.86 with a maximum value of 
344711000000000. The average value of return on assets which represents 
profitability is 0.0392655 with a maximum value of 0.71602. Leverage 
represented by debt to equity ratio has an average value of 0.8673853 with a 
maximum value of 8.74643. 
4.2 Multiple Linear Regressions 
Moderated regression analysis is performed after the data has been 
tested with classical assumptions in other words the data are free from 
problems of normality, multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and 
heteroscedasticity. Moderation regression analysis results are described in 
the table below: 
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Table 3 : Multiple Linear Regressions Result 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -0.290 0.353  -0.821 0.412   
IC -0.478 0.129 -0.207 -3.714 0.000 0.938 1.066 
BIND 0.749 0.353 0.116 2.120 0.035 0.972 1.029 
BEXP 0.336 0.178 0.116 1.884 0.061 0.771 1.298 
AC -0.220 0.100 -0.122 -2.195 0.029 0.942 1.062 
ACEXP 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.002 0.998 0.771 1.297 
TA -3.711E-16 0.000 -0.016 -0.292 0.771 0.917 1.091 
ROA -4.349 0.690 -0.349 -6.305 0.000 0.948 1.055 
DER -0.172 0.041 -0.228 -4.152 0.000 0.966 1.035 
a. Dependent Variable: lnCETR 
Source : Results of data processing with SPSS 23 
 
The results of data analysis and hypothesis testing state that the 
effectiveness of internal control negatively affected the cash effective tax 
rate so that the first hypothesis stating that the effectiveness of internal 
control negatively affected tax avoidance by companies was rejected with a 
confidence level of 5%. These results indicate that the more effective 
internal controls are applied, the tax payments will decrease thereby 
increasing tax avoidance actions undertaken by the company. Lee & Kao 
(2018) see tax avoidance as a form of tax planning carried out by 
management to increase company value. Lestari & Wardhani (2015) stated 
that tax planning has a positive effect on the value of the company where 
tax planning plays a role in increasing profit after tax so that the value of the 
company increases. Internal control is used within the company to ensure 
that the company's goals have been achieved, financial statements are free 
from material misstatements, comply with applicable regulations, and 
protect company assets (Rubino & Vittola, 2014). In this case, internal 
control is used to ensure that tax avoidance actions are effective in 
increasing company value. However, there are tax risks that make tax 
avoidance ineffective, management opportunistic behavior. Shin & Park 
(2019) state that the purpose of tax avoidance to increase company value 
will not be achieved if management behaves opportunistically. Therefore, 
internal control can reduce the opportunistic behavior of management in 
taking tax avoidance actions (Huang & Chang, 2015). However, Tjondro & 
Olivia (2018) in their research stated that tax risk in Indonesia is not the 
biggest challenge faced by companies because of the low tax risk. In this 
case, corporate tax risk is management opportunistic behavior in tax 
avoidance. This is supported by a survey conducted by KPMG (2014) which 
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states that the biggest risks for companies are economic, regulatory, political 
uncertainties, and public policies. Thus, when internal control increases, tax 
avoidance also increases because internal control only focuses on increasing 
company value. In relation to agency theory, good corporate governance 
will increase the effectiveness of tax avoidance to increase company value 
and reduce tax risk. The results of this study are not in line with research 
conducted by Bimo, Prasetyo, & Susilandari (2019) which states more 
effective internal control reduces tax avoidance. Based on empirical 
evidence from the research, internal control can reduce tax avoidance 
because it can prevent and detect mistakes made by management either 
intentionally or unintentionally so that management complies with 
applicable regulations. This is also influenced by the company’s internal 
environment because as a system internal controls are influenced by the 
environment in which the system is located. 
Furthermore, the results of data analysis and hypothesis testing state 
that the independent commissioner has a positive effect on the cash effective 
tax rate so that the second hypothesis which states that the independent 
commissioner has a negative effect on tax avoidance by the company is 
accepted with a significance level of 5%. These results illustrate that the 
higher the number of independent commissioners in a company increases 
the payment of corporate taxes so that tax avoidance decreases. Based on 
financial services authority regulations, an independent commissioner is part 
of a board of commissioners originating from outside the company and 
fulfilling the requirements as an independent board of commissioners. 
Independent commissioners on the board of commissioners help plan the 
company’s strategy, in the long run, monitor the implementation of the 
strategy, and reduce corporate tax avoidance. Therefore, the greater the 
proportion of independent commissioners within the company, it can reduce 
tax avoidance. In relation to agency theory, the presence of an independent 
commissioner is expected to reduce the opportunistic behavior of 
management through the supervisory function of an independent 
commissioner. This study is consistent with research conducted by Lanis & 
Richardson (2011) stated that independent commissioners have a negative 
and significant effect on tax avoidance because independence possessed by 
the board of commissioners can increase the effectiveness of supervision of 
actions taken by management and increase corporate tax compliance so that 
the proportion of commissioners higher independence can suppress tax 
avoidance measures. However, the results of this study are not in line with 
the results of research conducted by Tandean & Winnie (2016) state that the 
proportion of independent commissioners does not affect tax avoidance 
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because not all independent commissioners show their independent 
functions well and the difficulty of coordination among the board of 
commissioners so that the supervision process is hampered.  
Based on the results of data analysis and hypothesis testing found the 
influence of the expertise of the board of commissioners on tax avoidance. 
The expertise owned by the board of commissioners based on accounting 
and financial education background has a positive effect on the cash 
effective tax rate so the third hypothesis which states that the expertise of 
the board of commissioners has a negative effect on tax avoidance is 
accepted with a significance level of 10%. These results explain that the 
higher expertise of the board of commissioners can increase tax payments 
made by the company thereby reducing tax avoidance. Minnick & Noga 
(2010) argue that good corporate governance will improve corporate tax 
management. The board of commissioners is part of corporate governance 
that will determine the company’s tax management so that it requires a 
quality board of commissioners. The quality of the board of commissioners 
is seen from their expertise based on their educational background. In 
relation to agency theory, the more adequate expertise of the board of 
commissioners, the risk of tax avoidance is increasingly suppressed. The 
results of this study are in line with the results of research conducted by 
Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, & Larcker (2015) state that the expertise of 
the board of commissioners can inhibit an increase in corporate tax 
avoidance when tax avoidance is too high because it can lead to risks in the 
form of sanctions and a decline in corporate reputation. But it is not in line 
with the results of his research which states that the expertise of the board of 
commissioners has a positive effect on tax avoidance when tax avoidance is 
low where the expertise of the board of commissioners can improve 
corporate tax planning. 
Next to the results of data analysis and hypothesis testing state that 
the number of audit committee members has a negative effect on the cash 
effective tax rate so that the fourth hypothesis which states that the number 
of audit committees has a positive effect on tax avoidance is accepted with a 
significance level of 5%. These results illustrate that the more the number of 
audit committees in the company, the tax payments made by the company 
decrease thereby increasing tax avoidance. Every company is required to 
have an audit committee consisting of at least three people following 
regulations issued by the financial services authority. Vafeas (1999) states 
that the number of audit committees with a larger size can lead to inefficient 
corporate governance because it causes more frequent audit committee 
meetings. The audit committee is part of corporate governance. Inefficient 
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corporate governance causes several weaknesses, one of which is the lack of 
a process of supervision of management actions. Gaaya, Lakhal, & Lakhal 
(2017) stated that management tends to reduce the tax expense to increase 
profit after tax so that management gets compensation and bonuses. In 
relation to agency theory, the more presence of audit committees can reduce 
the effectiveness of supervision to increase opportunistic management 
which causes ineffective tax avoidance. The results of this study are 
consistent with the research of Tjondro & Olivia (2018) states that the 
number of audit committees has a positive effect on tax avoidance because 
the audit committee looks at tax avoidance in terms of efficiency and 
consideration of tax risk. In terms of efficiency, tax avoidance is measured 
using a utilitarian approach based on the value of its use if companies avoid 
tax, the value and performance of the company increases, but the audit 
committee in Indonesia considers that corporate tax risk is low so it does not 
become a major problem that needs to be evaluated. However, the results of 
this study are not in line with the results of research conducted by Pratama 
(2017) which states that the audit committee shows negative results on tax 
avoidance. 
The results of data analysis and hypothesis testing on the last 
hypothesis in this research model show that audit committee expertise 
viewed from accounting and financial education background does not affect 
on tax avoidance so the fifth hypothesis stating that audit committee 
expertise has a negative effect on tax avoidance is rejected at the level of 
significance at 5%. These results indicate that more or fewer members of the 
audit committee who have accounting and financial expertise do not affect 
the company's tax payments so that it also does not affect the tax avoidance 
actions undertaken by the company. This study is in line with the results of 
research conducted by Indayani (2019) regarding the effect of audit 
committee competence on tax avoidance. The cause of the results of this 
study is because the audit committee limits its authority in carrying out its 
duties and responsibilities such as being unable to access the documents, 
data, and information needed as well as difficulties in communicating with 
other parties needed in carrying out its duties. Another cause is because 
companies form audit committees only to comply with applicable 
regulations so that the competency of the audit committee in managing 
corporate taxes does not affect on tax avoidance. Therefore, audit committee 
expertise does not affect the tax avoidance of the company. Besides, 
research conducted by Arismajayanti & Jati (2017) also found no effect 
between audit committee competence and tax aggressiveness in line with 
the results of this study. However, the results of this study are not in line 
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with the results of research conducted by Deslandes, Fortin, & Landry 
(2019) which states that audit committee expertise has a negative effect on 
tax aggressiveness. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study aims to determine the effect of the effectiveness of 
internal control, independent commissioners, the expertise of the board of 
commissioners, the number of members of the audit committee, and the 
expertise of the audit committee on tax avoidance with the variable control 
of total assets, return on assets, and debt to equity ratio. This study was 
conducted on manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during 2016-2018. Data analysis was performed by descriptive 
analysis and the hypothesis was tested by multiple linear regression 
analysis.  
Based on the results of data analysis and the previous discussion, it 
can be concluded that the internal control effectiveness variable and the 
number of members of the audit committee have a positive influence on tax 
avoidance actions undertaken by the company while the independent 
commissioner variable and the expertise of the board of commissioners have 
a negative influence on the tax avoidance actions undertaken by the 
company. Another variable is the expertise of the audit committee does not 
influence on tax avoidance actions by the company. 
The limitation of this study is that it is difficult to find prior studies 
that are in line with the positive effect of the effectiveness of internal control 
on tax avoidance. Based on the existing limitations, there are several 
suggestions submitted for further research including audit committee 
expertise variables seen based on experience in the field of taxation or tax 
certification owned by members of the audit committee and using other 
independent variables that have the potential to influence tax avoidance 
such as audit quality. 
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